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China’s Crisis Bargaining in the South China Sea Dispute
(2010-2013)1
Eryan Ramadhani      Pembangunan Nasional University “Veteran” at Surabaya, Indonesia 
Abstract
As one of China’s most intricate territorial dispute, the South China Sea dispute has sufficiently 
consumed significant amount of Chinese leaders’ attention in Beijing. This paper reveals that 
China exerts signaling strategy in its crisis bargaining over the South China Sea dispute. This
strategy contains reassurance as positive signal through offering negotiation and appearing self-
restraint and of negative signal by means of escalatory acts and verbal threats. China’s crisis 
bargaining in the South China Sea dispute aims to preserve crisis stability: a stabilized condition 
after escalation in which neither further escalation nor near-distant resolution is in order. From the 
yearly basis analysis in the four-year span study, China’s longing for crisis stability fits into its 
conduct in crisis bargaining with Southeast Asian states.
Keywords: China, ASEAN, South China Sea Dispute, Crisis Bargaining
Background
The relations between China and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) date back to early 1990s when China 
struggled to break out the ostracism by 
international community following the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Storey, 1999). 
China acknowledged the importance of 
Southeast Asia region for its economic and 
strategic values (Li, 2010). In their first 
encounter, the South China Sea dispute stood 
as an obstacle that could pose a threat to the 
nascent relations. China asserted its claims on 
the disputed territory in the South China Sea 
by releasing its Law on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone in February 1992, 
hatching uproar from the apprehensive 
ASEAN states about China’s wave of 
aggressiveness (Buszynski, 2003). Soon after, 
at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) 
in July the six regional leaders issued ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea. It was 
ASEAN’s first common stance on the 
territorial row involving China. The succinct 
Declaration called for all interested parties to 
exercise peaceful manner in handling the 
dispute so that it would not magnify into an 
open conflict. 
Facing the more urgent and beneficial 
relations especially in economic field, inter alia, 
both China and ASEAN doggedly agreed not 
to let the dispute drive a wedge between them. 
In fact, China has firmly announced 
incessantly its position to put aside dispute 
settlement and to harness the more possible 
joint development (Fravel, 2011). Any 
attempts pertain to settlement must be 
discussed bilaterally between China and each 
ASEAN claimant states (Buszynski, 2003). 
Despite its recalcitrant to have discussion with 
ASEAN as a group, China moderated its 
attitude in 1999 by toeing the line of ASEAN’s 
path-breaking agenda to establish a regional 
code of conduct (COC) on the South China 
Sea. It is worthy of notice that during that 
period China decided to play relatively 
miniscule role while unequivocally reiterating 
that joint development was of no consequence 
than dispute settlement writ large. The first 
‘phase’ of discussion on a COC did not lend 
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any success. Devoid of unified positions on 
what a COC should be, a non-legally-binding 
declaration of conduct (DOC), in lieu of a 
COC, was signed in 2002. Valencia correctly 
asserts that “the sad truth is that the claimants 
agreed on a ‘declaration’ because they could 
not agree on a binding code,” (Rowan, 2005: 
435). The DOC aims to tone down the tensions 
in the respected area and rein the claimant 
states in from any escalation by means of 
building trust and confidence between and 
among them and holding dialogues. China 
agreed to sign the document for it does not 
touch on dispute settlement, a position China 
withholds.
For the past two decades China has been 
maintaining the pivotal role of bilateral 
negotiation, for the dispute itself is bilateral in 
nature, over multilateral negotiation. It is 
worth highlighting that bilateral negotiations 
are set only for sovereignty-clung issue which 
is ambiguous since China believes that it has 
indisputable sovereignty over the notorious 
nine-dashed line (Yahuda, 2013). The 
negotiation on a COC, as well as its 
predecessor the DOC, is based not on one-on-
one dialogues. China’s malleability is 
associated with the characteristic of a COC 
itself: a means to manage the dispute, not to 
settle it. Before the idea of regional COC was 
put forward on the negotiation table, China 
was in an agreement with the Philippines 
(Storey, 1999) and Vietnam (Thao, 2001) to 
have bilateral COCs-alike although the 
implementation of the codes remains 
questionable (Odgaard, 2003). Hence, the 
border should be drawn to differentiate 
between China’s bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation on the South China Sea dispute. 
China is fine to have talks with ASEAN as one 
entity in managing the dispute so as to 
preserve stability. Adversely, China is highly 
resistant to discuss sovereignty-related 
resolution beyond bilateral domain. China’s 
then Premier Wen Jiabao once said “we 
disapprove of referring bilateral disputes to 
multilateral forums because that will only 
complicate the issue,” (Thayer, 2011: 560). This 
is consistent with China’s claims that the 
South China Sea dispute is by all accounts 
bilateral issue.
That China has been indifferent to live up 
to ASEAN hope for concluding a COC; a 
sudden detour can be contemplated as 
marvelous. At the 19th ASEAN-China Senior 
Officials’ Consultation held on 2 April, 
Chinese officials appallingly announced their 
willingness, on behalf of China, to commence 
discussion with ASEAN on a COC later in the 
year (Thayer, 2013). The success organization 
of the 9th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group 
on the DOC and the 6th ASEAN-China Senior 
Official Meeting (SOM) on the DOC in Suzhou 
in mid-September 2013―dubbed as the first 
official round of consultations on the COC, 
sheds the light on a more cooperative China 
and a hope for a better dispute management 
and, to a lesser degree, settlement (Thayer, 
2013). The formulation of a COC undoubtedly 
has been a much-awaited result the 
negotiation between China and ASEAN could 
bring about. Although a COC does not 
amount to settlement, it certainly will become 
a guarantor of dispute management in South 
China Sea (Thao, 2001). 
Literature Review
When a territorial dispute ensues, there are 
three distinct destinations it can end up in: 
escalation or war, settlement or resolution and 
stalemate or status quo. China is of no 
difference. Looking back at history, China has 
long experience of dealing with twenty seven 
territorial disputes: both resolved (twenty two) 
and enduring (five). Of this number, seventeen 
are resolved through negotiation. The only 
occasion when China brandished its weapon 
was during the border wars with India in 1962 
and the defunct Soviet Union in 1969―the 
latter eventually results in peaceful border 
demarcation culminating in 2005.2 Regardless 
the appalling low level of coercion China has 
performed, the rhetoric of China’s proneness 
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toward using force lingers. In the period 
between 1949 and 1992, Alastair Iain Johnston
(1998) finds that among major powers China 
holds higher probability to be violent in 
territorial dispute as opposed to foreign 
policy-related issues and regime change, 
except for the United States (US). This, 
Johnston (1996) asserts, is rooted in China’s 
strategic culture that does not depart from 
realpolitik that justifies the long-standing 
offensive nature of China’s foreign policy. 
Andrew Scobell (2003: 193) finds that China 
performs a dual-mentality he calls ‘Cult of 
Defense’ representing both China’s nature of 
defensive and offensive (neither pacific nor 
belligerent) that renders “Beijing readiness to 
employ military force assertively against 
perceived external or internal threats all the 
while insisting that China possesses a cultural 
aversion to using force, doing so only 
defensively and solely as a last resort.” The 
negative power shift theory by M. Taylor 
Fravel (2007/2008) addresses that in some of its 
territorial disputes China takes inimical and 
dicey moves by exerting force based on two 
indicators responsible for state’s bargaining 
power: the amount of disputed land it holds 
and the ability to project power. Thus, when 
its claim is weak relative to the adversaries 
combined with declining power, China is 
keener to use force to avoid further 
unfavorable position. 
Taking the opposite view, some scholars 
argue that China also has proclivity to not use 
force in coping with territorial-related row. 
Fravel’s (2005) regime insecurity theory forges 
link between China’s regime insecurity and 
China’s decision to give concession of 
territorial claims to its neighboring states. The 
embattled regime is more lenient in conferring 
concession in exchange for domestic security. 
China’s domestic cleavages bring out 
negotiations aimed for domestic political 
stability which in turn will pull China from the 
brink of regime collapse. Using the South 
China Sea dispute as a case study, Ian James 
Storey’s (1999) ‘creeping assertiveness’ theory 
underlines that China refrains from using 
force and maintains diplomacy while 
concurrently strengthening its claims in the 
contested area. The same thought is depicted 
by Fravel’s (2011) delaying strategy, in which 
China prefers to delay the settlement in favor 
of conflict management without abandoning 
its claims. This strategy is chosen when China 
confronts an intractable dispute and reluctant 
claimant states to accept China’s terms. Ang 
Cheng Guan (2000: 202) says that China allows 
for a same pattern to recur with regard to the 
way it grapples with the South China Sea 
dispute called ‘capitalizing on opportunities’: 
dexterity in taking action at the right moment 
“when its perceived opponents are either 
distracted or when no strong response is 
expected.” According to Sun Xuefeng and 
Huang Yuxing (2012: 414-415), “in the absence 
of the homeland encirclement by foreign 
powers China might not respond to territorial 
disputes by resorting to forces.”
To sum up, the existing literatures mostly 
focus on the enigma of how and when China 
uses force and gives concession. However, 
none of them provides satisfactory explanation 
on China’s policy in negotiation with the 
adversaries. Furthermore, the way China 
conducts negotiation relating to territorial 
dispute over the South China Sea is left 
unexplored. Thus, this paper aims to fill the 
gaps on China’s territorial dispute policy in 
the South China Sea.
Crisis Bargaining and China’s Strategy
When states get embroiled in a conflict or 
crisis, the options available to them are either 
to go to war or to negotiate. As war becomes 
even more costly to execute, when the parties 
involved reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, 
bargaining through negotiation can be a 
promising alternative to ponder (Zartman, 
2001). Although there is no guarantee that 
crisis bargaining will always lead to a peaceful 
trajectory, once states learn the benefit of 
taking such strategy, even slightly compared 
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to that of shooting war, they are likely to carry 
it through (Fearon, 1995, 1998). The 
importance of crisis-bargaining lies in its 
ability to both prevent escalation and to usher 
in war. States involved both want to prevail on 
the crisis as well as to thwart war from 
happening (Morrow, 1992: 153). History 
provides abundant examples how crises were 
managed through bargaining that wound up 
in either peaceful resolutions or further crises 
or even wars.
There is no universal definition of what 
crisis bargaining is. Bargaining, according to 
Robert Powell (2002: 2), is deciding how to 
divide a ‘pie’, in which although potential 
gains might lure states to cooperate, they also 
posses the lust to maximize each own gains. In 
a not-so-distant view, Thomas Schelling states 
that bargaining is not a zero-sum game for the 
sake of winning absolute gains; rather, it is a 
relative-gains game with which states can 
cooperate to accomplish through bargaining
(Lebow, 2006: 431).
Crisis bargaining, simply put, is a way 
states entrapped in a crisis make attempts to 
bargain through various strategies to secure its 
interests and pursue gains. Spotted in an inter-
state crisis, state A employs a gesture of 
demand that results in state B’s response 
whether to accede to or defy such demand. If 
state B accedes, the crisis is resolved and state 
A gets what it demands. If state B defies, state 
A examines the defiance and sends threat 
asking for further compliance. Here, two 
scenarios might happen: either state B 
complies or state A compels once it learns that 
state B is unlikely to bend and back down. The 
bargaining itself takes place when each state 
responds to each other’s demands and threats 
that transpire in a sequential manner
(Morrow, 1989: 941).
Crisis bargaining steers state to 
considerately gauge the cost and benefit of 
every visage it displays to its own advantage. 
In so doing, a state employs disparate 
strategies that best fulfill its interests as 
costless as possible. Different strategies bear 
different costs and benefits. There is no best 
strategy that is superior to others. Nor is one 
that can guarantee the accomplishment of 
interests a state seeks for. As James Morrow 
(1989: 965) sums up, “the appropriate crisis 
bargaining strategy must reflect a nation’s 
commitment to the stakes of the crisis and its 
willingness to run the risks of escalation.” 
Signaling Strategy
A classic work of Robert Jervis (1970: 18) on 
images in IR signifies the indispensable role of 
signals as one component that buttresses crisis 
bargaining: “signals are statements or actions 
the meanings of which are established by tacit 
or explicit understandings among the actors.” 
From this definition a signal is premeditatedly 
showcased and deployed so that the other side 
can surmise the meaning of such action and 
learn the message contained. James Fearon
(1997) is among the laudable scholars whose 
work roots in crisis bargaining. In one his 
seminal work, he proclaims that when a 
sender sends a threat adequately credible that 
it incurs cost that he might otherwise be 
unwilling to do, it is a costly signal. Here, he 
chains costly signal to the credibility of using a 
threat. A credible threat is associated only 
with a resolved sender who is willing to pay 
the cost. 
Andrew Kydd (1997: 141) weighs in by 
stating that states can capitalize on a costly 
signal as a means to unfold their utilities and 
sustain themselves in a crisis without turning 
eyes to war. A costly signal is more palatable 
for security seeker states than aggressive ones.
A security seeker signals its willingness to do 
certain things, e.g. arms control, costly enough 
for it to renege and jeopardize the security it 
seeks. On the other hand, an aggressive state 
would be reluctant to forfeit its arms in 
exchange for insecurity and vulnerability 
because for it the cost is too extravagant. A 
costly signal shared and exchanged between 
security seeker states enables cooperation to be 
achievable. In another work, Kydd (2000: 326) 
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defines costly signals as those that distinguish 
trustworthy from untrustworthy states―only 
trustworthy states that are not hesitant to issue 
such signals, while untrustworthy ones find it 
too risky to materialize.
Regarding trustworthy-vs.-untrustworthy 
actors described by Kydd (2000: 326), a costly 
signal is of relevance to reassuring the other 
side of goodwill and trust that shepherds to 
cooperation. Janice Gross Stein (1991: 432)
defines reassurance strategies as an “attempt 
to reduce miscalculation through verbal 
assurances but a broad set of strategies that 
adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of 
the threat of use of force.” On the same page, 
Richard Ned Lebow (2001: 128) affirms that 
reassurance can allay the would-be challenger 
from taking any action that could inflame the 
crisis by communicating its benign and 
defensive intention. Taking a bit distinctive 
stance, Alexander George (2003: 466) assumes 
that the very conditions by which an 
adversary is more prone to taking hostile 
action due to its weaknesses, vulnerability, or 
misperception toward the intention of the 
other side is the reason that evokes 
reassurance’s prominence over deterrence. 
That adversary possibly feels vulnerable and 
insecure respecting its position in a crisis, 
strategy of reassurance can help manage fear 
and misunderstanding to dissipate, thus 
toning down the menace of escalation and war
(Lebow & Stein, 1995: 317). Joining the 
discussion, Kim Jungsoo (2010) inserts an 
alternative definition of reassurance strategy 
as a compensation for what deterrence cannot 
attain by performing a positive signal instead 
of threat. To ward off the use of force in a 
crisis, Stein says, reassurance can help 
gradually scale down the tension and make 
recourse-to-force an infelicitous option (Kim, 
2010: 9). 
China’s Signaling Strategy
The South China Sea discord is believed to be 
the hot spot for an actual man-to-man conflict 
insofar it is not handled considerately. Since 
the first military clash between China and 
Vietnam in the battle for Paracel Islands in 
1974 onwards, the region has been oscillating 
between escalation and de-escalation. In the 
past decade, nonetheless, the parties involved 
has buckled down in formulating regulation 
alike called the DOC, albeit not legally-
binding, to manage the crisis to not spiral out 
into an open military conflict. Such attempt is 
a part of crisis bargaining between China and 
ASEAN states and is still undergoing. The 
current tug-of-war centers on discussion and 
consultation among parties involved to 
orchestrate a legally-binding COC.
China’s signaling strategy is divided into 
two categories: positive and negative signals. 
Positive signal is any policy that helps temper 
the crisis from escalation. If a signal is positive, 
China is reassuring Southeast Asian neighbors 
of its longing for stability. A positive signal of 
reassurance constitutes displaying openness to 
negotiation on a COC and appearing self-
restraint. In reverse, if a conduct triggers a 
surge in crisis or escalation, it is a negative 
signal. Negative signals consist of escalatory 
acts (e.g. display of force, sanction, etc.) and 
verbal threats. Looking through the events 
coming about year-on-year from 2010 to 2013, 
it is conceivable to break down each policy 
into positive or negative signals.
Positive Signals
Reassuring self-restraint
Among other actions that can be classified as 
signal, protest remarks are not oblivious. One 
example was a rebuttal to Vietnam’s 
indignation that China’s vessels transgressed 
its sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in 
August 2010. A remark such this can be either 
positive or negative signal, depending on the 
message herein. If the remark was a 
proclamation of war, it certainly was a 
negative signal. In contrast, a self-restraint 
remark, such that displaying disagreement 
about other claimant state’s infuriating 
statement or controversial policy, could be 
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regarded as a positive signal. The 
aforementioned remark on Vietnam accusing 
China’s violation of its sovereignty exemplifies 
a positive signal, for it could be translated into 
keeping China from provocation.
The rift between China and the Philippines 
was another source of Beijing’s appallingly 
positive signals. In July 2011 during his visit to 
Beijing, Philippines Secretary of State Albert 
del Rosario made an agreement with China to 
concertedly look after the peace and stability 
in the South China Sea. President Aquino then 
made his own official visit to China in 
September for the sake of securing the $60 
billion-worth economic cooperation between 
the two nations. China appeared self-restraint 
when spokesperson Hong Lei on 14 July 
remarked a response to Philippines’ argument 
that China would not be able to validate its 
claims in concurrent with UNCLOS. He 
instead reaffirmed China’s insistence on 
resolving the dispute through “direct 
negotiations between related parties… [as] the 
most effective way,” (An, 2011).
Positive signals rooted in self-restraint 
remarks were detectable in 2012. Departing 
from the Scarborough Shoal incident, in April 
the Philippines requested China to bring their 
dispute before the ITLOS (International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). It was soon 
rejected by spokesperson Liu Weimin echoing 
the agreement that presaged the deal agreed 
by the two states to handle the dispute 
delicately through bilateral talks (China 
summons Manila, 2012). Deputy Foreign 
Minister Fu Ying then summoned Manila’s 
chargé d’affaires in Beijing to protest against the 
incident in the Scarborough Shoal in 
accordance with China’s rejection of the 
Philippines’ earlier request (Zhang & Qiu, 
2012). The protest and rejection served 
dauntingly as China’s positive signals that 
revolved around the standoff in the disputed 
territory. Even though the hawkish 
atmosphere hovered in Beijing, it did not make 
China exploit the moment forthwith. China’s 
Embassy to the Philippines consigned strong-
worded protest to the government in Manila 
castigating the harassment of Chinese 
fishermen who took shelter at a lagoon as the 
storm hit the area.
On 19 June Vietnam National Assembly 
passed the Law of the Sea encompassing both 
Paracel and Spratly Islands. Following this 
news Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun 
summoned Vietnamese Ambassador to China 
to protest Hanoi’s unilateral move that was 
also infringement upon China’s indisputable 
sovereignty. Zhang said that such action was 
“illegal, invalid and detrimental to peace and 
stability in the South China Sea,” (China 
opposes Vietnam, 2012). Along with the 
summons, China’s Foreign Ministry released a 
declaration to protest the law and the NPC 
officially shoved Vietnamese government to 
correct the disservice. China’s reaction toward 
this particular conduct was less belligerent 
than it actually could do. Instead of exerting a 
more coarse counteraction, China’s feedback 
on those protests was undoubtedly positive 
signals.
Beginning the year of 2013, the Philippines 
decided to follow through its plan to file an 
arbitration case, respecting the dispute against 
China, with ITLOS. Besides sending back a 
note verbale to the Philippines government, 
China basically did not take any superfluous 
action to correct or even punish Manila. 
Instead, China issued a remark that counter-
corroborated Philippines baseless claim for 
arbitration and explicated that China’s 
turndown of the request was solidified by 
international law, i.e. UNCLOS (United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
Reassuring openness to negotiation on COC
Remarks can also carry positive signals to 
buoy negotiation on a COC. On 30 September 
2010 China and ASEAN started negotiation on 
establishing a binding COC. Held in Manila, 
the discussion converged on the making of 
draft for the COC. China convinced its 
counterparts of its willingness to work with 
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ASEAN in constructive way to conclude a 
COC. As of the end of the discussion, no 
specific date was set for the conclusion of the 
negotiation, leaving it at a standstill. Albeit 
China’s commitment to push for negotiation 
had satisfied ASEAN states, China was 
resistant to “the inclusion of sanctions in the 
draft against claimant states that [would] 
violate the code under the process of 
consultations,” (China, ASEAN begin 2010).
This conduct referred to China’s positive 
reassurance toward ASEAN by welcoming a 
discussion on a COC, regardless some 
reservations China held as to what to include 
in the document.
With the signing of the Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the DOC in the South 
China Sea in 2011 a positive outlook for peace 
and stability came to live. On all accounts, 
China acknowledged the value of having a 
COC to keep the stability in the region intact. 
Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said
that “enacting a COC is part of the process to 
implement the DOC [and] China is willing to 
actively push forward the implementation of 
the DOC with ASEAN nations,” (Li & Zheng, 
2011). The commitment to move forward 
discussion on sustaining peace and stability 
was reiterated at the 14th China-ASEAN 
Summit on 18 November in Indonesia. On his 
official speech before the Summit, Premier 
Wen Jiabao said that China is “ready to work 
actively with ASEAN… and begin discussions 
on a COC in the South China Sea,” (Wang, 
2011).
At the 6th East Asia Summit on 19 
November Wen phrased that China along with 
ASEAN shared the common will to work for a 
COC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 
2011). Although the detail of when and how 
the discussion shall be embarked on was not 
present, such statement embedded a clue on 
the positive trajectory China wanted to take.
Representing China at the 45th AMM on 9 
July 2012, Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying 
informally held a dialogue with ASEAN 
leaders to determine the best way for them to 
forge a COC. Similar tone was detected when 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi delivered a 
statement at the 19th ARF that “China is ‘open’ 
to launching discussions on COC on the basis 
of full compliance with the DOC by all parties 
[and] hopes that all parties [would] do more to 
enhance mutual trust, promote cooperation
and create necessary conditions for the 
formulation of COC,” (Yan, 2012). Wen’s 
iteration of the consensus reached by China 
and ASEAN to brew favorable conditions for 
the DOC to be fully actualized and a COC to 
be hashed out during the 15th China-ASEAN 
Summit invigorated China’s attempts to 
reassure ASEAN, especially after the fray at 
the July meeting.
China reassured ASEAN about its 
willingness to perpetuate consultation on a 
COC at the 19th China-ASEAN Senior Officials’ 
Consultation in April 2013. The newly 
appointed Foreign Minister Wang Yi vouched 
China’s lingering will to work along with 
ASEAN to develop a COC from the principles 
laid out in the DOC. The 8th China-ASEAN 
Joint Work Group on the DOC celebrated the 
same spirit to promote a COC. To up China’s 
goodwill to contribute toward the 
management of peace and stability in the 
South China Sea, China and ASEAN made an 
accord at the 20th ARF in July to start the 
official consultations on establishing a COC. 
The same message was conveyed by Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang at the 10th China-ASEAN 
Expo in September that China would 
“continue to comprehensively implement all 
provisions in the [DOC] with an attitude of 
accountability and steadily facilitate talks over 
a COC in the South China Sea step by step 
under the framework of the [DOC],” (Yan, 
2013).
Official consultations eventually were held 
between China and ASEAN under the tagline 
of the 6th SOM and the 9th Joint Work Group on 
the Implementation of the DOC in September. 
The official dialogues were a follow-up of the 
shared commitment between the two sides 
that there was “the need to steadily move 
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toward the conclusion of a COC on the basis of 
consensus,” (Fu, 2013). Vice Foreign Minister 
Liu briefed that the meetings concluded “an 
agreement on a principle guiding the COC 
consultations which is a principle of gradual 
approach based on consensus and the 
consultations on the COC within the 
framework of implementing DOC,” (Bi, 2013).
Attending the 16th China-ASEAN Summit 
in October, Premier Li vowed to pursue the 
official consultations with ASEAN to 
formulate a COC as to better manage the 
dispute over spared territories and waters in 
the South China Sea. In the same month, Li 
later made a promise at the 8th EAS that China 
would “work jointly with ASEAN members to 
effectively implement the DOC and advance 
the consultations on a COC in an active and 
prudent manner based on the principle of 
consensus-building,” (Mu, 2013). As the year 
drew to an end, at the 9th Conference of the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP) on 3 December, Liu 
confidently stated that “China and ASEAN 
countries are making joint efforts to 
implement the DOC comprehensively and 
effectively and will push forward COC 
discussion,” (MOFA of PRC, 2013).
Negative signals
Escalatory acts
The first negative signal discovered in 2010 
stemmed from the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) Standing Committee approval of the 
National Defense Mobilization Law in 
February. This new Law would step up the 
regulation, organization and coordination of 
such program in all level of governance from 
county to state up to the state level. Even 
though in its Defense White Paper China 
restated its adherence to peaceful 
development dictum, this Law constituted to 
some degree China’s preparation for dealing 
with external uncertainties.
In February 2011 a China’s ship threatened 
a group of Philippines’ fishing boats whose 
activities were located in the west of Palawan 
Island. According to the Philippines 
government, the China’s ship opened fire to 
the fishing boats as they sheared off. There 
was no casualty reported as the three-round 
shots landed hundreds of meters from the 
fleeing fishermen. Another strain between 
China and the Philippines was repeated in 
March when a China’s vessel gave strong 
order to a survey ship MV Veritas Voyager to 
leave the Reed Bank. The ship was conducting 
research for oil and gas exploration. The next 
flashpoint of the year was the cable-cut 
incidents involving China and Vietnam in 
May and June. Accusations and counter-
accusations as to who was right and wrong 
marred the retained stability in the South 
China Sea. On a remark dated 28 May 
spokesperson Jiang Yu bluntly quipped that 
Vietnam had stained the bilateral consensus 
between the two states on the South China 
Sea―the same remark was repeated by 
spokesperson Hong Lei on June 9 (MOFA of 
PRC, 2011). 
The harbinger of 2012 sprang majorly from 
the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China 
and the Philippines. Both states took hawkish 
approach in order to prevail on the crisis. The 
decision not to back down which at one point 
contributed to the escalation that could drive 
both states to a shooting war nightmare 
illustrated China’s negative signal. The follow-
up decision not to escalate the heated crisis at 
the same time proved China’s weighing on the 
need for de-escalation. Unfortunately, 
conversed policies were soon taken by China 
that helped hamstrung the dispute 
management in the South China Sea. 
Following it, China’s Embassy in Manila 
issued a safety alert for Chinese people in the 
country of an impending wide-scale protest. 
The tension did not wane yet. The Chinese 
government announced a travel advisory to 
the Philippines that pummeled its tourism 
hardly. Tourism is one of Philippines most 
important source of domestic income, 
accounting for 5 percent of the total income. 
The travel warning “led to the cancellation of 
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scheduled airlines seats by approximately 15-
20 percent” (Ortuoste, 2013: 247). Tourism was 
not the only economic aspect struck by the 
territorial row in the Scarborough Shoal. Due 
to the tension China suspended its banana 
imports from the Philippines―the country’s 
fifth largest export commodity. 
The next big wave struck in July after the 
establishment of Sansha City located in a 
Woody Island, the biggest island in Paracel 
groups, equipped with a military garrison. 
Spokesperson Qin Gang expressed that 
“setting up Sansha City is the Chinese 
government’s necessary adjustment of the 
current administrative agencies, which is 
completely within China’s sovereignty,”
(China opposes US, 2012). As a result of this 
policy, the Philippines and Vietnam addressed 
strident protests toward China.
In March 2012 China’s naval exercise that 
took place in waters near James Shoal 
approximately 80 km from Malaysia’s 
Sarawak inciting protest from Kuala Lumpur. 
A month later a China’s maritime surveillance 
ship came back to the area and left steel 
markers to assert Beijing’s sovereignty.  
Although this incident was quickly scuttled by 
Malaysia, it could not help but raising 
fidgetiness among other claimant states.  Later 
on, China and the Philippines were embroiled 
in a near-to-second-standoff situation on the 
Second Thomas Shoal. When China 
dispatched thirty ships to outflank the 
Philippines soldiers who defended the area, 
many predicted that an escalation was in the 
offing. However, Beijing did not live up to that 
prediction and only accused Manila for illegal 
occupation on China’s territory.
Verbal threats
Foreign Minister Yang’s response at the 17th
ARF in 2010 Hanoi was acted as China’s 
negative signal of verbal threat. Having 
discovered that his fellow stateswoman 
Clinton encouraged ASEAN states to speak up 
their minds regarding the South China Sea 
dispute and herself later addressed a lengthy 
speech on the prominence the United States 
placed on the freedom of navigation and 
uninterrupted economic activities going 
through the South China Sea, Yang was chafed 
and retorted that “China is a big country and 
other countries are small countries and that is 
just a fact,” (Storey, 2010: 4). He then was 
reported storming out the room after making 
such insolent remarks. This reaction is a 
negative signal that could aggravate tension in 
the territorial row over the South China Sea. In 
November another negative signal came out of 
Chinese leaders’ decision to start the annual 
naval exercise in the South China Sea. 
In the aftermath of the Reed Bank incident 
in 2011, Yang warned for unilateral and illegal 
activities, including oil and gas exploration, in 
China’s territory without Beijing’s approval. In 
the following June, Vietnam and India 
concurred to jointly explore oil and gas in the 
blocks located in the contested waters in the 
South China Sea. China directly condemned 
such action adding a warning that no foreign 
company could conduct exploration in China’s 
waters without its sole permission (MOFA of 
PRC, 2011).
In the beginning of the Scarborough Shoal 
crisis, China retained its self-restraint not to 
further confound the imminent crisis through 
the use of diplomatic protest. Once the crisis 
failed to be tamed, both China and the 
Philippines were trapped in a two-month 
standoff. Beijing could not help but adjust its 
policy to a more hawkish one creating a surge 
of counter-action by Manila. China then 
announced the assignment of combat-ready 
patrols to disputed areas to defend its 
territorial sovereignty.
Summary of China’s Signaling Strategy
This four-year span study discloses 
changes in China’s bargaining strategy. In 
2010 both positive and negative strategies 
were not utilized sublimely. Reassurance on 
negotiation and self-restraint was hardly 
noticeable. Starting in 2011 China became 
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more amenable in signaling self-restraint and 
especially in reassuring its openness to 
negotiation, albeit fairly limited to general 
discussion on managing the South China Sea 
dispute. In the same year negative signals 
were also evident, spanning from verbal threat 
to physical protest toward illegal oil and gas 
exploration by claimant states. An alluring 
trend in this crisis bargaining strategy existed 
in 2012 with abounding positive and negative 
signals. In 2013 both signals pitched in to 
maintain the stability in the region, climaxing 
on the commencement of formal negotiation 
on a COC in September. China’s strategy in 
crisis bargaining with ASEAN can be summed 
up as follows:
Table 1. China’s Crisis Bargaining Strategy
Self-restraint is powerful 
reassurance, for states with superior 
capability have tendency to use it 
lavishly at their own advantage. This 
logic is corroborated by Lebow’s study 
on the Cuban Crisis of 1962. He 
contends that the success of the crisis 
defuse lay with the mutual 
reassurance between John F. Kennedy 
and Nikita Kruschev. One illustrious 
factor forging such triumph was 
Kennedy’s self-restraint not to attack 
Cuba regardless his country’s 
superiority both militarily and 
geographically, instead continuing 
extensive communication with 
Kruschev (Lebow, 2001). 
In this study context, official protest 
remarks must be differentiated between 
ones that constitute self-restraint and 
threat. Threat-bound remarks imply what 
Stein (2013) calls ‘if-then’ scenario: if B 
does not do what A says, then A will 
harm B. This implication however need 
not accrue in a crystal-clear form. China’s 
verbal threat through protest remarks, 
such as the warning for illegal oil and gas 
exploration in the disputed waters, do not 
unreservedly touch on harmful treatment 
the contestant might receive should it 
defers. Yet, different remarks mentioning 
and emphasizing China’s resoluteness to 
defend its territorial integrity accustom 
Stein’s scenario. For example, 
spokesperson Hua Chunying said that 
“China is firm and resolute in defending 
national territorial sovereignty [while] at 
the same time…always maintain that 
relevant territorial disputes should be 
properly solved through bilateral 
negotiations and friendly consultations,”
(MOFA of PRC, 2013). Self-restraint-
bound remarks conversely imply China’s 
response toward other claimant states’ 
actions that instead of using force the 
China’s side opts for verbal protests. 
Aside from signaling self-restraint, 
China has been studiously reassuring 
ASEAN states of its willingness and 
support to persist dialogue and 
consultation including negotiation on the 
widely endorsed COC. Reassurance aims 
at calming down tensions that otherwise 
might spur into military conflict. States 
reassure their adversaries through 
establishing cooperation or giving certain 
rewards out of compliance. In this study 
reassurance focuses on openness to
negotiation and self-restraint. This does 
not mean that cooperation is not offered. 
Positive signals Self-restraint Openness to negotiation
Negative signals Escalatory act Verbal threat
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Instead, both bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with ASEAN states has 
savored an upsurge in the past years. The 
reason for choosing reassurance on 
negotiation and self-restraint is that they 
straightly connected to the dispute itself, 
in a sense that they do not need longer 
period of time to affect the responses or 
policies of ASEAN states. China’s offered 
cooperation is in majority long-term 
projects and every single project takes 
time for adjustment and enforcement.
China’s less belligerent conducts in the 
South China Sea dispute as suggested by 
preceding analysis does not tally with 
what the pessimists has long predicted. It 
is not deniable that China did flex its 
muscle several times by signaling threats 
of both verbal and non-verbal forms. Nor
is the fact that China’s naval activities 
become more numerous in the past few 
years.  However, it is noteworthy to 
cogitate what veers China to perform 
certain conducts under the crisis 
bargaining theme. 
Connecting China’s Crisis Bargaining to 
Crisis Stability in the South China Sea
The goal of crisis bargaining is avoiding 
further escalation or war. States resort to 
bargaining when the cost to continue their 
bellicose acts exceedingly becomes 
unaffordable. Or simply because they find 
it more lucrative to win the crisis through 
bargaining regardless their willingness 
and capability to bear the burden of 
protracted war. Although there is no 
certainty that such bargaining will cater 
for resolution instead of exacerbating the 
crisis, states come to this at least hoping 
for stability. Stability itself does not 
necessarily mean resolution. The prospect 
for both sides to be drawn into another 
escalation or war remains.
  Crisis stability in international 
relations (IR) literatures is mostly 
associated with the Cold War era nuclear-
based stability between the US and Soviet 
Union. The main thesis is that first-strike 
advantage might not be offsetting on 
account of the capability of second strike 
to induce high-scale retaliation (Powell, 
1989). Thus, stability had oddly prevailed 
during that period, since neither the US
nor Soviet Union would like to wager on 
starting war. Even though most literatures 
on crisis stability were written during and 
in the wake of Cold War, some lessons for 
today’s conditions could be drawn upon. 
Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour 
(1987: 833-834) state that crisis stability 
ensues after escalation from which states 
attempt to curb the simmering situations. 
They find that sometimes threats can be 
utilized to prop up conciliatory postures 
of both sides in order to stabilize the 
crisis. States escalate on purpose before 
damping it down to stabilize the crisis 
through the use of threats. Nonetheless, 
there has to be a capability to recourse the 
crisis, otherwise it would be just a suicide 
risk-taking mission (Langlois, 1991: 802). 
Crisis stability aims primarily to impede 
an outbreak of war and not merely to 
come out of feud as a winner (Axelrod, 
1990). It can be attained when both sides 
agree that war gives birth only to mutual 
destruction (Jervis, 1991). According to 
these literatures, the element of threat is 
crucial to support crisis stability. Another 
is escalation. Albeit none of them 
mentions how the message of crisis 
stability states prefer is best conveyed, 
crisis bargaining can be one way. This 
paper argues that crisis bargaining is a 
means for states to achieve crisis stability. 
As Avery Goldstein (2013, 51-52) says, 
“crisis stability is greatest when both sides 
strongly prefer to continue bargaining.” 
China’s bargaining in the South China Sea 
is of no difference.
Crisis stability in the South China Sea 
means that the territorial fracas does not 
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escalate into an all-out war. Nor does it 
get resolved. It does not equal to status 
quo per se either. Rather, it is a transition 
from escalation to status quo (Langlois, 
1991). Therefore, the South China Sea 
crisis is stable when there is an upward 
movement of frictions between and/or 
among the parties involved followed by a 
downward movement of such 
occurrences. A yearly-based analysis 
shows the dynamic of China’s crisis 
bargaining that leads to crisis stability 
over the South China Sea row.
The previous section unveils China’s 
bargaining strategy consisting of both 
positive and negative signaling. In 2010, 
no heavy escalations emerged although 
negative signals were apparent. 
Reassurance was not ostensible partly 
because of the lack of escalation. That 
being said, the year 2010 was entitled to 
crisis stability. The following year of 2011 
was home to a wave of escalation, such as 
the cable-cut incidents and the expulsion 
of survey ships in the contested waters. 
There was for certain an ascending trend 
of escalation. Reassurance through 
offering negotiation on a COC and self-
restraint started to bounce up too albeit 
fairly limited. The mixture of varying 
positive and negative signals was 
commensurate with crisis stability 
premise. 
Moving forward to 2012, the escalation 
rate was almost similar to that of 2011, 
perhaps more intense. The brinkmanship 
in Scarborough Shoal lent support for the 
heightened tensions between China and 
some of its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
The ‘punishment’ received by the 
Philippines succeeding the incident made 
the dispute even fester. In spite of it, what 
is striking was the positive signaling, 
particularly reassurance of openness to
negotiation. Chinese leaders made more 
remarks and pledges aiming at reassuring
ASEAN states of China’s preference of 
negotiation over force. The mentioning of 
discussion and consultation on a COC 
boosted up China’s de-escalation 
endeavor. Yet, China did not set a certain 
date for negotiation to start that rendered 
ASEAN states’ suspicion of Beijing real 
motive. Despite the dearth of realization 
of the vowed negotiation, there was the 
South China Sea crisis stability in 2012. 
Escalations were discernible in the first 
half of 2013. China’s incursion in 
Malaysia-claimed James Shoal and
encirclement of the Second Thomas Shoal
were the major source that succeeded in 
straining the relations between China and 
ASEAN. Similar to the preceding year, 
positive signals attempting to deescalate 
tensions were spotted. But unlike 2012, 
the words orchestrating pledge of 
negotiation on a COC eventually turned 
to deeds; hence, making the crisis more 
stable in 2013.
The aforementioned analysis confirms 
the argument that China seeks for crisis 
stability in the South China Sea spat 
through crisis bargaining―by means of 
signaling strategy. Positive signal of 
reassurance contributes to stability; the 
negative one to instability. 
Table 2. Crisis stability in the South China Sea Dispute
(Rough measurement based on China’s signals)
Level of escalation Level of de-escalation Crisis stability
2010 Low Low Stable
2011 Medium Medium Stable
2012 Medium High Stable
2013 Medium High Stable
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It can be fairly said that positive and 
negative signals are offsetting each other 
in order to keep the crisis stability intact. 
That Beijing has pinned an ‘indisputable 
sovereignty’ on the disputed territory and 
waters in South China Sea, skeptics are 
certain that any resolution that might strip 
China off the territory is not on demand. 
It is true that China has steadily 
articulated its position that its sole 
sovereignty is unquestionable. However, 
China highly values its strengthened 
relations with ASEAN that it will not let 
anything, including the South China Sea 
dispute, to come between the two sides. 
China delicately takes care of this crisis by 
ensuring its stability. It is in accord with 
what crisis stability is about that at a 
certain point states, regardless of their 
capabilities vis-à-vis the adversaries, 
advocate a U-turn from escalation to 
stabilization. The motivation might vary. 
China surely is in possession of more 
cutting-edge military technology against 
ASEAN states combined, but it has not 
gone further from escalation stage. 
Instead, China fosters negotiation with 
ASEAN on something that it had been 
against, the COC. This way, China has 
validated the maintenance of crisis 
stability in 2013.
Conclusion
This paper argues that China performs 
crisis bargaining in coping with the South 
China Sea dispute against Southeast Asian 
claimant states in order to keep the crisis
stable. By stable it means the crisis does 
not escalate into a military conflict. Since 
China keeps insisting on its indisputable 
sovereignty over the contested areas in 
the South China Sea which reflects to 
some degree the unlikelihood for it to give 
up its claims, a stable crisis could also 
refer to a condition when concession is 
unlikely to be given at any time in the 
near future. Thus, keeping the crisis stable 
amounts to managing the dispute to stay 
in the domain of status quo. China crisis-
bargains in the South China Sea dispute 
by means of implementing signaling 
strategy. This strategy is categorized into 
two types: positive and negative signals. 
Positive signals are those that prop up 
crisis stability over the South China Sea; 
negative signals are those that catapult the 
crisis to escalation. In 2010, both signals 
were hardly conspicuous, making crisis 
stability difficult to discern, although the 
dispute itself was sufficiently stable. 
Escalation began to crescendo in 2011 and 
peaked in mid-2012 with the cable-cut 
incidents involving China and Vietnam 
and the Scarborough Shoal standoff 
between China and the Philippines served 
as the highlight respectively. It did not 
cease in 2013 but slightly descended. 
Along the way, positive signals of 
reassurance parched the holes resulting 
from the negative signals. Reassurance 
shot in 2012, especially in the half-end of 
the year, driven partly by the Scarborough 
Shoal incident earlier in the year. From 
crisis stability point of view, stability was 
apparent in 2012 on account of the 
escalation that opened the year and the 
reassurance that ended it. This stability 
was retained in 2013 whose escalation,
drawing from the James Shoal and Second 
Thomas Shoal incidents, was menacing 
but then offset by a high-level of 
reassurance climaxing in the initiation of 
COC negotiation. The major finding from 
the analysis on China’s crisis bargaining 
in the South China Sea dispute is that 
crisis stability at this juncture is the most 
favored goal the leaders in Beijing are 
aiming for.
Notes
1 The year 2010 as the starting point is 
chosen because it was the first time the 
South China Sea dispute became 
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internationalized with the United States’ 
interference in the regional meeting. This 
is at odds with China’s persistent in 
keeping the crisis between itself and 
Southeast Asian states, especially the 
claimant states. Some studies suggest that 
China’s assertiveness started to take off 
earlier and capped in 2009, e.g. the killing 
of a Vietnamese fisherman by Chinese
patrol vessels in 2007 and the Impeccable
incident and Vietnam-Malaysia joint 
submission to the United Nations 
Commission on the Limits of Continental 
Shelf in 2009 (Emmers, 2010; Thayer, 
2011). However, during that period 
interesting twist-and-turn in China-
ASEAN relations was not generously 
ample. China’s responses to such events 
were quiet modest. Also, there is a 
constraint with regards to the availability 
of the archive on China’s official remarks 
(the English version) before the 
designated period of this study. 
According to Bjrn Jerden (2014), the 
rhetoric of China’s new assertiveness in its 
overall foreign policy is a sheer 
misunderstanding. In contrary, after 
Clinton’s remarks confirming the United 
States national interest on the South China 
Sea in 2010, the tensions began to accrue. 
Alastair Iain Johnston (2013), in a similar 
tone, argues that China’s new 
assertiveness in the South China Sea 
started to take shape in 2010. Thus, it is 
worthy of investigation as to how China 
comes to grips with the new dimension of 
a more convoluted, if not partially 
internationalized, territorial dispute 
against some ASEAN member states. The 
year 2013 is selected because it was a start 
of China’s policy change in terms of 
negotiation with ASEAN from a staunch 
objection to moving forward with 
negotiation on a legally-binding COC to 
an endorsement of one.
2 The war with Vietnam in 1979, though 
broke out in the border between the two 
states, was not driven primarily by 
territorial issue. In a year leading up to 
the war, scores of border provocations 
between the two sides occurred without 
clear evidence of who was responsible for 
the first shot. Nonetheless, the main 
reason for China’s ‘teach Vietnam a 
lesson’ military assault was more 
geopolitical than territorial: Vietnam’s 
closer relations with the Soviet Union and 
invasion to China’s partner Cambodia. 
Meanwhile, China accused Vietnam for 
intruding its border, which was counter-
argued by Vietnam, and for persecuting 
and expelling ethnic Chinese to South 
China provinces. For comprehensive 
analysis on Vietnam War 1979 see Tretiak 
(1979) and Zhang (2005).
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